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Civil Liberties Constraints on Tribal Sovereignty
After The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
Robert Berry"
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968' provided a legislative
answer to the question of whether, and to what extent, fundamental
civil liberties recognized in constitutional law should constrain
federally recognized Indian Tribes 2 in the exercise of their

sovereign powers. In enacting this law, Congress weighed its
desire to protect individuals from arbitrary and overly intrusive
*The author is a Masters Degree candidate at the Graduate Faculty, New
School for Social Research, Political Science Department.
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq.
"Mere are currently close to 500 federally recognized Indian tribes and their
number can be expected to grow as nonrecognized tribes surmount the
bureaucratic hurdles to federal acknowledgement. Those Indian communities that
lack federal recognition cannot exercise powers of sovereignty within the federal
system and are not eligible for federal programs specifically benefitting Indians.
See DAVID H. GETCHES & CHARLES F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (2d ed. 1986). Significantly, federal recognition of
tribal status is a political - and not an ethnological - matter. Ethnologically
distinct tribes were occasionally consolidated to form a larger political unit and
single tribes were at times broken up into smaller units. See FELIX COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 5-7 (Rennard Strickland, et al. eds., rev.
ed., 1982).
Although the Supreme Court has warned that Congress'
determination of tribal status should not be arbitrary (United States v. Sandoval,
231 U.S. 28 (1913) (upholding congressional recognition of Pueblo Indians as
"dependent tribes" for purpose of prohibiting liquor)), it has never interfered with
such a determination. Today federal recognition can be terminated (with tribal
consent), restored, or acknowledged for a first time, as was recently the case with
the 450-member Micmac Tribe of Maine. See Maine Indians Win Recognition,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 28, 1991, at 8; 137 CONG. REC. H9653 (daily ed. Nov.
12, 1991) (statement of Rep. Miller). There are also tribes that are recognized
for some federal purposes but not for others. See COHEN, supra, at 7. See
generally ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1189-99 (3d ed. Michie 1991); Timothy Egan, IndiansBecome Foes
In Bid for TribalRights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1992 at A26 (discussing intertribal
competition over resources as an additional impediment to recognition).
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tribal actions against the tribes' interest in retaining their legal
capacity to act as self-governing entities. Congress struck the
balance between these two competing interests by drafting a bill of
rights that reflected the particular circumstances of the tribes.3
The possibility of an appeal by writ of habeas corpus to a federal

3 This law, as enacted, reads:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of
religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition
for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to
be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just
compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to
a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict
cruel and unusual punishments, and in no event impose for
conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment
greater than imprisonment for a term of six months or a fine
of $500, or both [amended by Act of Oct. 27, 1986 to read:
for a term of one year and a fine of $5,000, or both];
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or
property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by
imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not
less than six persons. 25 U.S.C. § 1302.

Indian Civil Rights Act
district court was also explicitly provided.4
The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) was controversial at its

inception and continues to generate controversy today, a quarter of
a century after its passage. An ongoing dispute surrounds the
tribes' ability to enforce ICRA in a meaningful way. This dispute
has been fueled by disturbing allegations of corruption in tribal
governments and of violations of due process and equal protection
by those governments. 5 In order to understand the origins of
ICRA and why it remains problematic, this article will discuss
tribal sovereignty, pre-ICRA cases which had a major impact on
the sovereign capacity of the tribes, and the salient cases where
ICRA was interpreted.
I. The Legal Framework of Tribal Sovereignty
Indian tribes in the United States are recognized as having
inherent powers of sovereignty. 6 They possess all powers of
4 This provision was codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1303 and reads: '"he writ of
habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a court of the United States,
to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe."
- While no one can say with great certainty how extensive this corruption is,
or how frequent these deprivations of civil liberties are, there is continuing
congressional interest in investigating the manner in which tribes enforce ICRA
guarantees. See, Enforcement of the Indian Civil Rights Act: HearingsBefore
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-49 (1988)
(testimony of James Schermerhorn, Special Litigation Counsel for the
Department of Justice) (setting forth a list of ICRA complaints and discussing
the problem of insufficient information concerning the effectiveness of tribal
enforcement of ICRA). There has also been legislation proposed that would
expand the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear ICRA appeals on a wider array
of legal grounds. 135 CONG. Rsc. S2186 (daily ed. March 6, 1989) (statement
of Sen. Hatch).
See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (holding that
successive trials by tribal and federal courts do not violate the double jeopardy
provision of the Fifth Amendment).
A practical consequence of tribal
sovereignty has been that while other peoples have sought equal protection under
state and federal law, Native Americans have often sought to preserve their
autonomy from both. Another striking and exceptional instance of selfgovernment (entirely unacknowledged, though viable and enduring) emerged
6
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sovereignty not explicitly modified by treaty or by federal statute
or implicitly modified by virtue of their dependent status.7
Historically these modifications of tribal powers have been

from within America's Chinese Communities.
CHINESE AMERICANS

See STANFORD M. LYMAN,

29 (1974).

7 See

Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), where the
Supreme Court in a 6-2 decision (Justice Brennan abstained) held that federally
recognized Indian tribes had lost criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians when
they submitted "to the overriding sovereignty of the United States." 435 U.S. at
210. Justice Marshall, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented, writing that:
In the absence of affirmative withdrawal by treaty or statute, I am of the view
that Indian tribes enjoy as a necessary aspect of their retained sovereignty the
right to try and punish all persons who commit offenses against tribal law
within the reservation.

435 U.S. at 212. A discussion of the weaknesses of Justice Rehnquist's opinion
for the majority (particularly of that opinion's reliance on peripheral materials,
such as the language of bills that were never enacted, to argue in support of an
"unspoken assumption" that the tribes lacked the sovereign power at issue) can
be found in Robert Laurence, Justice Thurgood Marshall'sIndianLaw Opinions,

27 How. L. J. 35-40 (1984).
In 1980 the Court expanded its holding in Oliphant to include situations
in which a tribe seeks to exercise criminal jurisdiction over an Indian who is not
a member of that tribe. Although federal law had not explicitly removed
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians from the recognized powers of the
tribes, the majority chose to depart from a restraintist theory of judicial
interpretation and to hold that the disparate treatment of nonmember Indians and
non-Indians at issue would violate ICRA's equal protection guarantee.
Confronted with the fact that its holding would create a "jurisdictional void" over
minor crimes (serious crimes fall under federal jurisdiction pursuant to the Major
Crimes Act of 1885 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153)), the majority pointed out
that: "States may, with the consent of the tribes, assist in maintaining order on
the reservation by punishing minor crime." Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697
(1990) (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting).
The jurisdictional void created by Duro proved to be more than
Congress could abide by and the definition of "powers of self-government" in 25
U.S.C, § 1301(2) was amended in 1990 to mean "the inherent power of Indian
tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians." Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 101-511,
§ 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1892-93 (1990) (emergency measure made permanent in
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indians, Pub. L. 102-137, § 1, 105 Stat. 646 (1991)).
See Mausseaux v. United States Comm'r of Indian Affairs, 806 F. Supp. 1433,
1441-43 (D.S.D. 1992) (discussing legislative history of this amendment).

Indian Civil Rights Act

extensive in matters concerning external features of sovereignty'
Though
and limited in matters of internal self-government.'
substantially modified, it is a mistake to assume that tribal
sovereignty has only a vestigial character. Indeed, as one authority
on U.S./Indian relations notes:
[the] tribes enjoy sovereign immunity from suit and are not
subject to adverse possession, laches, or statutes of limitation.
Tribes can exercise the right of eminent domain, tax, and
create corporations. They can set up their own form of
government, determine their own members, administer justice
for tribal members, and regulate domestic relations and
members' use of property. They can establish hunting and
fishing regulations for their own members within their
reservations and can zone and regulate land use."

The fundamental parameters of tribal sovereignty were
established by the Supreme Court in three enduring decisions
penned by Chief Justice John Marshall:

Johnson v. McIntosh,"

" These external features include "the power to transfer tribal land without
federal approval, the power to carry on relations with nations other than the
United States, the power to regulate non-Indians when no tribal interest justifies
such regulation, and the power to impose criminal punishment on non-Indians."
COHEN, supra note 2, at 245-46.
9Though limited, congressional intrusions upon tribal self-government are
by no means rare. For example, Congress has occasionally enacted statutes
defining membership in a tribe in terms of race and percentum of blood, in
apparent disregard of the tribe's own criteria for membership. A district court
defended this practice by writing:
...if

the legislation is to deal with Indians at all, the very reference to them
implies the use of "a criterion of race,.... Necessarily continued intermarriage
with white persons would ultimately produce persons who were in no true
sense Indians. At some reasonable point a line must be drawn between Indians
and non-Indians, between those properly to be regarded as continuing
-members of the tribe, and those who are not.

Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F. Supp. 808, 814-15 (E.D. Wash. 1965), affid
per curiant, 384 U.S. 209 (1966).
10 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER:
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 1188 (1984).

"

21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,2 and Worcester v. Georgia.3 In
the first of these decisions Marshall steered a course between
recognizing that the tribes held full title to lands that they occupied
or finding that they held no effective title whatsoever. Marshall
held that a tribe could not grant its land to an individual without
federal authorization and thereby met "a pragmatic need to fit
Indian title into our system of land tenure with a minimum amount
of disruption to well-established procedures by which title to
millions of acres of Indian lands had already been obtained."' 4
Marshall's opinion discussed an aspect of U.SJIndian relations which impacted both on land transfers involving the tribes
and the tribes status as sovereign nations. Originally in the
Americas, principles of discovery of previously unknown lands
guaranteed to European nations an "ultimate dominion" over the
territory claimed and conferred on them an exclusive "right of
acquiring the soil from the natives." The tribes continued to enjoy
an "Indian right of occupancy," but were unable to alienate their
lands to foreign states or to individuals without the approval of the
nation asserting an ultimate title to it. In what were essentially
relations worked out between European states, a central feature of
the tribes' status as sovereigns was modified.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original
inhabitants were, in no instance entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to be the
rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as a just claim to
retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion;

but their right to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, was
necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their
own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original
fundamental principle that discovery gave exclusive title to those who

made it.'

1

3.0 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).

'3

31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).

'4

GETCHES AND WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 42.

IS Jolvson,

21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573-574.
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Marshall refined this notion of a limited tribal sovereignty
in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.'6 This case involved a state's
efforts to extend its laws over tribal territory lying within its
boundaries. Georgia's defiance of federal law, coupled with the
executive's hostility toward any ruling that would strengthen the
autonomy of the tribes and forestall their relocation westward,
produced a political crisis. If the Court were to abide by existing
statutory law and legal precedent and issue a ruling adverse to
Georgia, a substantial likelihood existed that the Court would be
ignored. Marshall sidestepped this dilemma by determining that
the Court did not have jurisdiction to resolve the issue. He wrote
that tribal nations were not "foreign" nations as contemplated in
Article HI, Section 2 of the Constitution, 7 but were rather
domestic dependent nations:
They occupy a territory to which we assert a title
independent of their will, which must take effect in point of
possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile
they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.
They look to our government for protection; rely upon
its kindness and its power, appeal to it for relief to their wants;
and address the President as their great father. They and their
country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by
ourselves, as being so completely under the sovereignty and
dominion of the United States, that any attempt to acquire their
lands, or to form a political connection with them, would be
considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of
hostility.'

In Worcester v. Georgia,'9 Marshall further solidified his
analysis of tribal sovereignty by refusing to find implied
abdications of tribal power in the vague and carelessly broad

16 30

U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).

7 U.S. CONST.

art. III, § 2 states: "The judicial power shall extend to...

Controversies ... between a State...and foreign states ......
1s Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17-18.
'9

Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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language of the various treaties that had been made with the tribes.
This case arose when two missionaries were imprisoned under a
statute that prohibited white persons from residing upon Cherokee
territory without the permission of Georgia's governor. The Court
found jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789 based on Georgia's
interference with U.S./Indian relations rooted in treaties and federal
statutes. Georgia's laws were held to be without force within the
boundaries of the Cherokee Nation. Marshall stressed the fact that
Indian treaties constituted an explicit recognition of the national
character of the tribes:
The Constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well
as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has
adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian
nations, and consequently admits their rank among those
powers who are capable of making treaties. The words
"treaty" and "nation" are words of our own language, selected
in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves,
having each a definite and well understood meaning. We have
applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the other
nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same
sense.20

II. A Dichotomy in Interpretations of Tribal Sovereignty
The decisions influencing federal Indian law that have
followed Johnson, Cherokee Nation and Worcester interpreted the
principle of tribal sovereignty in disparate ways. *Getches and
Wilkinson have identified two clashing tendencies among these

decisions: a tendency to strengthen the autonomy of the tribes as
self-governing political entities and the tendency to erode tribal
sovereignty by either extending state jurisdiction to tribal territories 2 1 or by emphasizing Congress' plenary authority to regulate

20

31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559-60.

"' See, e.g., United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882), where the
murder of a non-Indian by another non-Indian upon tribal territory (the Ute
Reservation) was held to fall within the jurisdiction of the state of Colorado and
not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.
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matters affecting the tribes.22
In Ex parte Crow Dog,23 the Court issued a salient decision which strengthened tribal sovereignty. This case involved a
murder committed in "Indian country," which the Court defined as
"all the country to which the Indian title has not been extinguished
... even when not within a reservation. '2 4 Both the victim and the
perpetrator, Crow Dog, were members of the Sioux Nation.
Following Crow Dog's conviction in a district court for the
Territory of Dakota, an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court
upon a writ of habeas corpus. Crow Dog contended that inasmuch
as the murder occurred within Indian country, no crime had been
committed against the United States, and therefore the district court
lacked jurisdiction. The Court agreed that jurisdiction in this case
was exclusively a tribal matter insofar as statutes had extended
federal jurisdiction to crimes committed in Indian country by:
(1) Indians upon non-Indians or upon Indians of another tribe; and
(2) by non-Indians upon Indians or upon non-Indians; but not by
Indians upon members of their own tribe.
Crow Dog's
imprisonment was declared illegal. Justice Matthews, writing for
the court, expressed concern regarding the unfairness of extending
federal law to intratribal disputes and, in doing so, also
demonstrated the pall of racism that hung over many of the
decisions concerning Indians:
It is a case where... law... is sought to be extended over

" Cases tending to erode tribal sovereignty reflect the influence that
assimilationist ideology has had on American political development. Such cases
were, and continue to be, grounded less in a careful reading of the historical
record than in an assumption that the tribes have "withered under the weight of
non-Indian society and that the courts should acknowledge the declining of tribes
and doctrines such as tribal sovereignty." GETCHES

AND WILKINSON,

supra note

2, at 279. See, e.g., People v. Snyder, 144 Misc. 2d. 444, 446 (N.Y. County Ct.,
Erie County, 1988) (suggesting that the "trend" in Indian policy "is clearly
moving away from the concept of sovereignty and toward incorporation of Indian
citizens fully within mainstream society").
2

109 U.S. 556 (1883).

24

1d. at 561.
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aliens and strangers; over the members of a community,
separated by race, by tradition, by the instincts of a free though
savage life, from the authority and power which seeks to
impose upon them the restraints of an external and unknown
code, and to subject them to the responsibilities of civil
conduct, according to rules and penalties of which they could
have no previous warning, which judges them by a standard
made by others and not for them; which takes no account of
the conditions which should except them from its exactions,
and makes no allowance for their inability to understand it. It
tries them, not by their peers, nor by the customs of their
people, nor the law of their land, but by superiors of a
different race, according to the law of a social state of which
they have an imperfect conception, and which is opposed to
the traditions of their history, to the habits of their lives, to the
strongest prejudices of their savage nature; one which measures
the red man's revenge by the maxims of the white man's
morality."

Crow Dog had not escaped punishment entirely, but had
submitted to a traditional sanction requiring him to compensate the
victim's relatives according to the terms that they set.26 Popular
opinion, however, much preferred hanging as a punishment.
Outrage over Crow Dog's successful appeal, coupled with the
aggressively assimilationist sentiments of that era," produced a
SId. at 571.
26 VINE DELORIA,

JR. &

CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN

INDIANS,

AMERICAN JusTICE at 168 (1983).
27

The complete assimilation of tribal peoples became a paramount goal for

policy makers from the 1870s through the 1920s and again in the late 1940s
through the 1950s. This goal was often expressed at considerable length in
annual reports issued by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, as was the case in the
1885 report authored by Commissioner J.D.C. Atkins:
They must abandon tribal relations. they must give up their superstitions; they
must forsake their savage habits and learn the arts of civilization; they must

learn to labor, and must learn to rear their families as white people do. and to
know more of their obligations to the Government and to society. In a word.
they must learn to work for a living and they must understand that it is their
interest and duty to send their children to school. Industry and education are
the two powerful co-operating forces which, together, will elevate the Indian,
and plant him upon the basis of material independence. They will awaken the
spirit of personal independence and manhood, create a desire for possessing
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legislative response: the Major Crimes Act of 1885.28 This act
extended federal jurisdiction to encompass intratribal disputes
occurring within tribal territory where any of seven major crimes
had occurred.

The validity of the Major Crimes Act was forcefully
affirmed soon after that act's passage. Justice Miller, writing for
the Court in United States v. Kagama,29 went beyond grounding
congressional power over intratribal crimes in the commerce clause
and posited an extra-constitutional source for such authority:
•.. [The] power of Congress to organize territorial governments, and make laws for their inhabitants, arises not so much
from the clause in the Constitution in regard to disposing of
and making rules and regulations concerning the territory and
other property of the United States as from the ownership of
the country in which the Territories are, and the right of
exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the National
Government and can be found nowhere else.3
Justice Miller's analysis refused to recognize any sovereign

property, and a knowledge of its advantages and rights.

Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, House Executive Document No.
1, 49 Cong. I Sess., serial 2379, 5 (1885).
Such widespread lack of tolerance for tribal belief and tribal methods
became a chronic wellspring of conflict and misunderstanding between federal
administrators of Indian policy and the tribes. In urging a more moderate approach to U.S/Indian relations Frank Hamilton Cushing of the Bureau of
Ethnology recommended that Indians indeed be offered a practical education but
only by persons of "high ability" who were "possessed of a large understanding
of human nature." Before this could happen, however, such persons would have
to first be sent "to the Indians as themselves students." Frank Hamilton Cushing,
The Need of Studying the Indian In Order to Teach Him: An Address Delivered
Before the Board of U.S. Indian Commissioners At Washington D.C. 4-5 (A.M.
Eddy, 1897), reprintedin Board of U.S. Indian Commissioners, Annual Report
for 1886 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1897).
2 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
29 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (upholding federal jurisdiction over intratribal
murder).
30Id. at 380.
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capacity on the part of the tribes and deformed the salient
precedents established in Cherokee Nation and Worcester to fit that
interpretation. Miller emphasized the tribes' status as "'wards of
the Nation,' 'pupils,' as local dependent communities" and
concluded that:
The power of the General Government over these remnants of
a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers,
is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of
those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that Government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the
theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the
United States, because it has never been denied, and because
it alone can enforce its laws on all the Tribes.?'

Justice Miller's characterization of the tribes as "remnants"
was not accurate inasmuch as the majority of the tribes continued
to exercise autonomous powers of self-government. The Cherokee
Nation, for example, retained exclusive jurisdiction over intratribal
offenses pursuant to a treaty of 1866. When a tribal conviction for
murder was appealed upon a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the sovereign status of the tribe and established
the doctrine which federal Indian law scholars have referred to as
"constitutional immunity." Under this doctrine, the limitations on
governmental powers guaranteed in the Constitution do not apply
to tribal governments. 32 The appeal which gave rise to this

31

Id. at 384-85.

An exception would be found in the Thirteenth Amendment, which
amendment's proscription against slavery applies to all persons within the United
States regardless of whether they act on behalf of a governing entity or as private
individuals. See In re Sah Quah, 31 F. 327 (D. Alaska 1886), where a district
court ruled that traditional slave holding practices among the Indians of Alaska
violated he Thirteenth Amendment and ordered the emancipation of an Indian
held in bondage. It is interesting to note that the district court in Satz Quali
narrowed its holding to apply only to Alaskan Indians - which it described as
"dependent subjects" - and not to the tribes that had retained sovereign capacities. The Alaskan Indians were, the decision surmised, "essentially patriarchal,
and not tribal, as we understand that term in its application to other Indians.
They ...have no independence or supremacy as will permit them to sustain and
32
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decision, Talton v. Mayes,33 was based on a perceived violation
of the Fifth Amendment's grand jury clause 34 and the Fourteenth

enforce a system of forced servitude at variance with the fundamental laws of the
United States." Id. at 329.
Slavery had also existed among the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws,
Chickasaws and Seminoles; tribes that had sided with the Confederacy during the
Civil War. The federal government negotiated treaties with these tribes in 1866
that abolished slavery and required that membership in the tribes be extended to
former slaves. COHEN, supra note 2, at 665.
163 U.S. 376 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting without opinion). Part of
Harlan's objection to the Talton holding may have had to do with the fact that
it left the application of the Constitution - and of the fundamental, as well as
remedial, rights guaranteed by that document - to the will of Congress, a body
that is, itself, a constitutional creation. See Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197
(1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (holding that the provisions embraced by the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments did not apply to the Territory of Hawaii prior to
congressional legislation explicitly extending those provisions). In Mankichi
Harlan wrote that:
3

... if the principles now announced should become firmly established, the
time may not be far distant when, under the exactions of trade and commerce,
and to gratify an ambition to become the dominant political power in all the
earth, the United States will acquire territories in every direction, which are
inhabited by human beings, over which territories, to be called "dependencies"
or "outlying possessions," we will exercise absolute dominion, and whose
inhabitants will be regarded as "subjects" or "dependent peoples," to be controlled as Congress may see fit, not as the Constitution requires nor as the
people governed may wish. Thus will be engrafted upon our republican
institutions, controlled by the supreme law of a written Constitution, a colonial
system entirely foreign to the genius of our government and abhorrent to the
principles that underlie and pervade the Constitution. It will then come about
that we will have two governments over the peoples subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States, ----one, existing under a written Constitution, creating
a government with authority to exercise only powers expressly granted and
such as are necessary and appropriate to carry into effect those so granted; the
other, existing outside of the written Constitution, in virtue of an unwritten
law, to be declared from time to time by Congress, which is itself only a
creature of that instrument.

Id. at 240.
U.S. CONST. amend. V states "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentation or indictment of
a Grand Jury . ..."
34
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Amendment's Due Process Clause3' where a tribal indictment
occurred by a five-person grand jury. Such a jury, the appellant
claimed, was insufficient under either federal law or the laws of the
Cherokee Nation. Writing for the majority in Talton, Chief Justice
Edward White concluded that:
...
the existence of the right in Congress to regulate the manner
in which the local powers of the Cherokee Nation shall be
exercised does not render such local powers Federal powers
arising from and created by the Constitution of the United
States. It follows that as the powers of local self-government
enjoyed by the Cherokee Nation existed prior to the Constitution, they are not operated upon by the 5th Amendment, which
as we have said, has for its sole object to control the powers
conferred by the Constitution on the National Government. 6

Justice White further held that the issue of whether an indictment
by a federally deficient grand jury violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause had been previously resolved in
Hurtado v. California." The Court there refused to incorporate
the grand jury requirement into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.' The question in Talton of whether the appellant's indictment violated Cherokee law was "solely a matter within

the jurisdiction of the courts of that nation." 39
"'

U.S. CON T. amend. XIV § 1 states:...'"nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...."
36Talton, 163 U.S. at 384.
17

110 U.S. 516 (1884).

' See Barta v.Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 392 (1959), where the inapplicability of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to federally recognized Indian tribes was reiterated. In
this opinion - which stemmed from due process challenges to a tribal tax
imposed on nonmember lessees of Oglala Sioux grazing and farm lands - the
court of appeals held that the Fourteenth Amendment could not limit the
legislative powers of Indian tribes inasmuch as such entities were not states. Id.
at 556.
" Talton, 163 U.S. at 385.
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While the Talton opinion has been widely championed by
proponents of tribal sovereignty, it did not act to diminish
congressional power to regulate the Tribes. A subsequent opinion
delivered by Justice White in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,"' reiterated

this power forcefully. The case arose when statutes were enacted
providing for the allotment of Kiowa, Comanche and Apache lands
to individual tribal members, and the sale of surplus land. These
statutes implemented an 1892 agreement for the cession of tribal
lands made between the federal government and members of those
tribes. That agreement, however, violated an earlier treaty"
guaranteeing that no cession of tribal lands was possible without
the written consent of three quarters of all the adult male members
of the tribes. When the statutes at issue were challenged, the Court
refused to interfere with Congress' power to act, regardless of the
earlier conflicting treaty provisions:
Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has
been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power
has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.... When
...
treaties were entered into between the United States and a
tribe of Indians it was never doubted that the power to
abrogate existed in Congress, and that in a contingency such
power might be availed of from considerations of government
policy, particularly if consistent with perfect good faith towards
the Indians.2

The Court refused to question the motives which might lie beneath
the challenged legislation and noted that if injury to the tribes had

resulted from an exercise of power on the part of Congress, then
"relief must be sought by an appeal to that body for redress, and

40 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
" This treaty of 1867 - called the Medicine Lodge Treaty - demarked a
reservation to be occupied by the Kiowa, the Comanche, and by such other tribes

as might peacefully join them. The Apache subsequently came to occupy this
reservation by operation of a separate treaty. Id. at 554.
Id. at 566.
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not to the courts." 43
Though the underlying reasoning of these precedents is
inconsistent, none of them have been substantially modified and
they continue to be cited frequently today. Crow Dog and Talton
were built upon the Marshall decisions to reinforce the doctrine of
tribal sovereignty while Kagama and Lone Wolf emphasized the
dependency of the tribes on the federal government and created a
doctrine out of Marshall's dicta comparing the tribes to wards."
The synthesis of this disparity emerges in the ironic notion that the
tribes have full powers of sovereignty over their territories except
to the extent that those powers have been modified or terminated
by Congress' or compromised by the tribes' dependent status.
It is important to note, however, that Congress' plenary authority
over Indian affairs is not an "'absolute"' authority, as is made clear
in the most recent edition of Felix Cohen's Handbook of Federal
Indian Law.46 In addition to the vague notions that Congress
must act in good faith and in the best interests of the tribes, there
are also grounds to challenge congressional action that are more
amendable to judicial review:
Plenary does not mean "absolute," in the sense that it may be
exercised free of constitutional limits or judicial review. It is

41187

U.S. at 568. The aspect of the Lone Wolf opinion which interpreted
treaty abrogations as political matters and, as such, inappropriate for judicial
review has been modified in subsequent opinions. Federal courts no longer have
the luxury of taking Congress' good faith toward the tribes for granted and must
now treat the presence or absence of congressional good faith as a question of
fact. See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
See COHEN, supra note 2, at 220.
5 See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (Black, J.) (holding that
a civil suit brought by a non-Indian plaintiff for a cause of action originating on
Navajo, territory fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of tribal courts). In
Williams, Black wrote for a unanimous Court that "[t]he cases in this Court have
consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations.
..-[I]f this power is to be taken away from them, it is for Congress to do it."
id. at 223.
"See

COHEN,

supra note 2.
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settled today, although it may not have been when the term
"plenary power" was first utilized, that Congress is subject to
constitutional strictures in dealings with Indians. Cases have
held, for example, that ifthe Congress takes Indian property
for non-Indian use, the United States is liable under the fifth
amendment of the Constitution for payment of compensation
and an uncompensated taking may be rejoined. (citations
omitted)47

As cases arose challenging certain actions on the part of
tribal governments as violative of fundamental civil liberties,
federal courts frequently found that they lacked the capacity to rule
on such issues absent a explicit grant of jurisdiction by the
legislature. In Toledo v. Pueblo de Jamez48 a district court
considered a complaint brought by Protestant members of a Pueblo
Indian community alleging that they had been subjected to
"indignities, threats and reprisals" in an effort on the part of the
Pueblo to coerce them to accept Catholicism. The complaint,
based on a federal civil rights statute 49 that provided a federal

cause of action against state officials for discrimination, was
dismissed due to the fact that the Pueblo did not derive its
"governmental powers from the State of New Mexico. ' 50

47
COHEN, supranote 2, at 217. The plenary power doctrine has occasionally
sustained some rather drastic instrusions into tribal self-government. Among the
most blatant of these intrusions was a 1906 statute empowering the President of
the United States to appoint the Principle Chief of the Cherokee Nation. When sixty-five years after its passage - the legality of the act was challenged by five
members of the Cherokee nation, the Tenth Circuit held that the court below had
properly dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In a poorly reasoned
opinion, the court held that the challenge to the act - on grounds that it
transgressed the Fifth and Fifteenth Amendments - was "so lacking in substance
and so contrary to the well established law enunciating the power of the
Congress to legislate with respect to Indian tribes and their affairs that it affords
no substantial basis for a claim of federal jurisdiction." Groundhog v. Keeler,
442 F.2d 674, 678 (10th Cir. 1971).

4

119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954).

4

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

" Toledo, 119 F. Supp at 432.
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Another controversy involving religious freedom arose when
the Navajo Tribal Council adopted an ordinance prohibiting the use
of peyote and made arrests pursuant to that ordinance.5 Members
of the Native American Church brought an action seeking to enjoin
further enforcement of the ordinance, contending that it violated the
guarantee of free exercise of religion provided by the First
Amendment and made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Tenth Circuit concluded that neither
the First nor the Fourteenth Amendments limited the tribe:
... Indian tribes are not states. They have a status higher than
that of states. They are subordinate and dependent nations
possessed of all powers as such only to the extent that they
have expressly been required to surrender them by the superior
sovereign, the United States. The Constitution is, of course,
the supreme law of the land, but it is nonetheless a part of the
laws of the United States. Under the philosophy of the
decisions, it, as any other law, is binding upon Indian nations
only where it expressly binds them, or is made binding by
treaty or some act of Congress.'

Federal courts, however, were not always reluctant to find
jurisdiction to hear tribal civil liberties appeals. In Colliflower v.
Garland," the Ninth Circuit concluded that a writ of habeas
corptis had wrongly been denied a member of the Gros Ventre
Tribe sentenced to five days' imprisonment, where the action by a

s' Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th
Cir. 1959).
5 Id. at 134-134.
See also Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v.
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1967), where the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an action seeking to invalidate a tribal election
alleged to have violated the due process and equal protection guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment as well as the right to vote guarantee of the Fifteenth
Amendment.

"

342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
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court of Indian offenses 54 was alleged to have been "taken
summarily and arbitrarily, and without just cause." The Ninth
Circuit based its reasoning upon the notion that the sentencing
court was in part a federal entity:
In spite of the theory that for some purposes an Indian tribe is
an independent sovereignty, we think that, in the light of their
history, it is pure fiction to say that the Indian courts functioning in the Fort Belknap Indian community-are not in part, at
least, arms of the federal government. Originally they were
created by the federal executive and imposed upon the Indian
community, and to this day the federal government still
maintains a partial control over them.5
The Colliflower court relied heavily on Kagama -

at length -

which it quoted

and upon the concomitant notion that Worcester was

out of date. Referring to Worcester the court suggested that:

5 Distinction is made in federal Indian law between "tribal courts," which
are based on a law and order code adopted by a tribe and "courts of Indian
offenses" or "C.F.R. courts" which are based on federal regulations. Many of
the courts which were once courts of Indian offenses have converted to tribal
courts with the adoption of the necessary tribal laws. See 25 C.F.R. § 11. 1(d).
As Getches and Wilkinson note, there are also a "[v]ery few tribes" that "retain
judicial systems based upon Indian custom." GETCHES AND WILKINSON, supra
note 2, at 386.
" Colliflower, 342 F.2d at 379. Following Colliflower, a subsequent Ninth
Circuit decision vacated a district court's dismissal of a habeas corpus appeal
brought by a Yakima Indian who had been convicted of violating tribal fishing
regulations and fined $250. Like the court in Colliflower, the court in Settler v.
Yakina Tribal Court was offended at the summary character of the conviction:
there must be and is a limit to the 'exclusive' authority of the Yakima
Nation to regulate Indian fishing when that regulation becomes so summary and
arbitrary as to shock the conscience of the federal court.. . ." The court further

held that where no other avenue for appeal presented itself, habeas corpus review
was appropriate: 'The availability of habeas corpus appears particularly
appropriate where the petitioner, although not held presently in physical custody,
has no other procedural recourse for effective judicial review of the constitutional
issues he raises." Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court 419 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970). [Note: the controversy in Settler arose prior
to the effective date of ICRA, rendering that statute inapplicable to its resolution].
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We know that in the more than one hundred and thirty years
that have since passed, the "independence" of the Indian tribes
and their resemblance to nations, have decreased, and their
dependency has increased. As the United States has expanded,
it has repeatedly broken its treaties, has taken the Indian's land
by force, has repeatedly imposed new and more restrictive
treaties upon them, has confined them in ever smaller
reservations, often far from their original homes, and has
reduced
them to the status of dependent wards of the govern56
ment.

III. The Indian Civil Rights Act and its Applications
The developments in the decisional law affecting the
constitutional rights of Indians have increasingly occupied the
attention of Congress. The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights began investigating the constitutional rights of American
Indians in 1961 and found those rights to have been abused by all
three sovereigns in the federal system: state, national and tribal.
The response to this unacceptable state of affairs focused
exclusively on the tribal governments. A bill proposed by Senator
Sam Ervin of North Carolina would have made tribal governments
"subject to the same limitations and restraints as those which are
imposed on the Government of the United States by the United
States Constitution. 5 7 An accompanying bill provided for appeal
from a tribal forum to a federal district court, which appeal would
take the form of a trial de novo. Other bills provided for investigation of complaints by the Attorney General;58 for the development
of a Model Code for the tribes;5 9 for requiring tribal consent
before a state could assume civil or criminal jurisdiction over tribal
territories; 6° and for the employment of legal counsel, 6' as well

16

Colliflower, 342 F.2d at 375.

57111 CONG. REc. 1799 (daily ed. Feb 2, 1965) (statement of Sen. Ervin).

5 This provision was not enacted.
59 25 U.S.C.

§ 1311

6o 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326
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as for other general housekeeping matters."
Indian law scholars have pointed to the incomplete nature
of the legislation the Subcommittee proposed, noting that it
answered the problem of abuse of civil rights by tribal governments, but entirely neglected the equally compelling and more
pervasive problem of abuse of the rights of tribal Indians by the
federal government, the states, or their political subdivisions. The
senators may have assumed that other civil rights enactments would
adequately fill this gap. Another possible explanation is that the
senators were, in part, motivated by a desire to encourage the
assimilation of the tribes. An insight into this possibility was
provided by Donald Burnett Jr. in a thorough study of ICRA's
legislative history. Burnett examined the political background of
Senator Sam Ervin, who championed the ICRA bills and made
their passage a long-term personal project. Ervin, however, was
not a strong supporter of civil rights measures, in fact he had
previously opposed them.63 Burnett concluded that underneath
Ervin's express concern over the civil rights of Indians lay an
assimilationist sentiment:
Senator Ervin could politically afford to support
Indian rights largely because of the extensive assimilation of
North Carolina Indians into southern life. The Cherokee and
Lumbee settlements had been fully integrated into the state's
governmental structure as counties and municipalities. It has

been said that they represent a small, unaggressive, poorly
differentiated minority in the state. This integration has been

facilitated, especially in the case of the Cherokee, by the early
evolution of legal institutions modeled after those of their
white neighbors.

Their codes, courts, sheriffs, and police

forces, for example, have long been in existence.
While this fact freed Senator Ervin to investigate
Indian rights without political difficulty at home, it limited his

61

25 U.S.C. § 1331

62

111 CONG. REC. at 180M-02 (1965), see also 1968 U.S.

ADM. NEWS

CODE CONG. AND

1863-67.

Donald Burnett, Jr., An Historical Analysis of The 1968 'Indian Civil
Rights' Act, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 575 (1972).
63
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perspective. During the hearings, he revealed his inclination
to try to duplicate the North Carolina assimilation experience
on a national level. He demonstrated this predilection by
focusing on how the systems of tribal justice outside North
Carolina failed to conform to the country's constitutional
scheme."

Ervin's proposal to hold the tribes to the same constitutional
standards as the national government and to provide for a trial de
novo upon appeal to a district court met considerable resistance
from several of the tribes and from the Department of the Interior.
The Department instead offered a proposed redraft of the bills at
issue tailoring established fundamental rights to better fit the
general circumstances that surrounded the operation of tribal
governments and eliminating the provision for a trial de novo.65
In introducing this redraft, Frank Barry, Solicitor for the
Department of the Interior, pointed to the inapplicability of the
Fifteenth Amendment to the tribes, who "would want to restrict
voting to members and to restrict membership to persons having a
certain proportion of Indian blood."' 66 Barry also discussed the
inapplicability of the Third Amendment, the Seventh Amendment
and the Fifth Amendment's grand jury clause, and noted the failure
of the proposed legislation to include the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause. On behalf of the Department, Barry
urged Congress to proceed methodically in its efforts to impose
civil liberties constraints on tribal governments:

64

Id. at 576.

65

Hearings on [Bills] to Protect the Constitutional Rights of American

Indians, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, 89 Cong. I Sess. 318 (1965)
(statement of Sen. Ervin) [Hereinafter "Hearings"]. Burnett contends that tribal
objections to the trial de novo provision stemmed from the fact that it would
have usurped part of the functions of the tribal courts, whereas objections of the
Department of the Interior (under whose authority the Bureau of Indian Affairs
operates) stemmed from the fact that the Department had jurisdiction to hear
appeals from those courts which were operating under administrative rules and
procedures - the courts of Indian offenses - and did not wish to part with any
of its authority. Burnett, supra note 63, at 593.
66

Hearings supra note 65, at 18.
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By taking the pains to specify the rights it is desirable to
extend to the Indian, we assure ourselves that all of the basic
rights intended are included in the legislation and that no
restrictions are imposed upon the tribal governments which are
not necessary to protect the individual Indian against action by
the tribe. Finally, by giving consideration to each of the rights
so extended, its reasonable relationship to the differences
between Indian tribes and the U.S. Government is assured.67

In creating ICRA, Congress followed the advice of the
Department of the Interior and drafted a modified bill of rights to
limit the powers of government exercised by the tribes. This bill
also provided for federal appellate jurisdiction upon a writ of
habeas corpus, as opposed to an appellate jurisdiction necessitating
an entirely new trial at the federal level. As the editors of the 1982
edition of the Handbook of Federal Indian Law have noted, the
limitations upon tribal governments imposed by ICRA are considerably narrower than constitutional restraints imposed upon the
national government and upon the states:
Many significant constitutional limitations on federal and state
governments are not included in the Indian Civil Rights Act....
Notable omissions are the guarantee of a republican form of
government, the prohibition against an established religion, the
requirement of free counsel for an indigent accused, the right
to a jury trial in civil cases, the provisions broadening the right
to vote, and the prohibitions against denial of the privileges
and immunities of citizens. [citations omitted.]'

The first case to interpret ICRA, Dodge v. Nakai, dealt
with the Navajo Tribe's exclusion from tribal territory of a
nonmember serving as director of the reservation's legal services

67

Hearings supra note 65, at 18-19.

' COHEN,
69

supra note 2, at 667.

298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969).
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program.7" There was no writ of habeas corpus, as would be
required to bring the case within the district court's purview under
a strict reading of ICRA. The Dodge court instead chose to locate
its authority to hear the case in statutes granting federal jurisdiction
in controversies involving federal questions, civil rights and
mandamuses. 7 In a holding widely regarded as an unwarranted
intrusion into tribal powers of self-government, 72 the court ruled
that an exclusion order issued under the authority of the Navajo
Tribal Council was a legislative act effecting a punishment and, as
such, a bill of attainder violative of ICRA. The court moreover
found the summary nature of the exclusion order violative of the
due process provision of ICRA and, looking to the excluded party's
long-term involvement in a political dispute with the tribe,
determined that the order violated the subsection of ICRA that
guaranteed freedom of speech:
This action ... constitutes an abridgment of free speech on the

Navajo Reservation, both the freedom of speech of the lawyer

who is representing his clients in a manner deemed acceptable
to his employer, and the freedom of speech of the clients who
seek out that lawyer to act as their spokesman in the

community.7"

During the decade following the passage of the act, federal
courts followed the example of the earlier Dodge court, and
continued to locate their authority to settle controversies arising
under ICRA in a variety of jurisdictional statutes. The courts
viewed the passage of ICRA as implying a waiver of the tribes'
sovereign immunity and turned their attention to the issue of how
The tribal exclusion order was based on an incident in which the party to
be removed had laughed during a meeting between tribal officials and legal
services representatives. The officials' animosity toward the individual in
question had evidently already been well established before the incident took
place. 298 F. Supp. at 32.
70

71 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(1), 1343(4), 1361 and 1651.

n See, e.g., DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 26, at 132-33.
" Dodge, 298 F. Supp. at 37.
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closely interpretations of ICRA guarantees

should parallel

interpretations of similar constitutional guarantees. The issue was
addressed peripherally in Groundhog v. Keeler.74

The court,

relying upon a Senate subcommittee report that had described an
ICRA bill as extending some, but not all, of the requirements of
the Equal Protection Clause to the tribes, concluded that the equal

protection guarantee in ICRA was narrower than the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The editors of Cohen's
Handbook of Federal Indian Law, however, have criticized this
aspect of the Groundhog opinion for its-careless use of legislative
history:
The court based this view in part on an erroneous reference to
the Act's legislative history. The court quoted a Senate Report
referring to the Act's equal protection provision without
noticing that the Senate Report described an earlier draft of
that provision, which would have protected only "members of
the tribe," a standard obviously narrower than that of the
fourteenth amendment. The bill was amended before passage
to protect all "persons. '"

Both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits followed the lead of the
Tenth Circuit in Groundhog, and have held that ICRA guarantees
are less extensive than parallel constitutional guarantees. In
Wounded Head v. Oglala Sioux Tribe,76 the court of appeals relied

4 442

F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971).

75COHEN,

supra note 2, at 669-70, n. 60.

The issue of whether or not ICRA
guarantees duplicated - or merely approximated - similarly worded constitutional guarantees was also discussed in a case involving a civil suit initiated by
fired employees of a tribal government who claimed that their dismissal was in
retaliation for their having demonstrated against a tribal policy and, as such,
violative of ICRA. Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 1143, 1146 (D.S.D. 1974),
remanded, 521 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1975) (district court reached merits
prematurely, not having first determined that all tribal remedies had been
exhausted). The district court in Janis,in granting the defendant tribe's motion
for summary judgment, held that ICRA guarantees did not duplicate constitutional guarantees of parallel wording. The court felt that it had been Congress'
76

507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1975).
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on the Groundhog opinion to argue that ICRA's equal protection
subsection was not coextensive with that contained within the
Fourteenth Amendment. The court relied on this equal protection
analysis to set aside an argument that a tribal election law requiring
members to be twenty-one years old to vote violated ICRA. This
approach, however, was unnecessary and was also flawed insofar
as it relied upon the Groundhog court's weak reading of ICRA's
legislative history.
Equal protection of the laws as established in ICRA requires
a tribe to treat all persons within its jurisdiction equally, absent a
reasonable necessity for doing otherwise. It does not, as the
plaintiffs in Wounded Head contended, require the tribes to import
federal law, or state law, into their jurisdictions in an effort to
guarantee that their members receive the same treatment as voters
without its boundaries. The court's efforts at narrowing ICRA's
equal protection guarantee were superfluous to its holding,
especially when we consider that Congress intended ICRA's
guarantees to extend up to the point at which they would be used
to bring rights that Congress clearly meant to exclude inside of
ICRA's reach. Congress was deliberate in the silences it left in
ICRA and there is no reason to believe that the substance of a

intent that ICRA guarantees be "harmonized with legitimate tribal interests" and
set forth the following considerations to be taken into account:
. . . the plaintiffs' remaining claims under 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) and (8),
[ICRA's subsections guaranteeing freedom of speech and due process of law]
under the facts of this case, must not be measured by the same standards
imposed by the Bill of Rights on state and federal governments, but rather
these limitations must be applied with recognition of the Oglala Sioux Tribe's
unique cultural heritage, their experience in self government, and the
disadvantages or burdens, if any, under which the defendant government was
attempting to carry out its duties.

385 F. Supp. at 1150-51.
See also Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1976) (The Sixth

Amendment does not require the tribes to guarantee a right to an appointed
counsel, and they are only bound by ICRA's guarantee of a right to counsel at
criminal defendant's own expense). In Toni the court of appeals noted that:
the courts have been careful to construe the terms "due process" and "equal
protection" as used in the Indian Bill of Rights with due regard for the
historical. governmental and cultural values of an Indian tribe. As a result,
these terms are not always given the same meaning as they have come to
represent under the United States Constitution.

Id. at 1104, n.5.
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guarantee as obvious as the Twenty-Sixth Amendment's was left
out by oversight. Nor is it necessary to erode the rights that are
included in ICRA to make its exclusions more persuasive.
While the problem of interpreting the extent of ICRA
guarantees remains, the opportunity for the federal judiciary to hear
ICRA cases was substantially lessened in 1978 when the Supreme
Court reawakened the issue of the tribes' sovereign immunity from
suit in Santa Clara v. Martinez.7' No single case has had a
greater impact on the enforcement and interpretation of ICRA.
This case, which restricted federal review of ICRA cases to those
actions brought upon a writ of habeas corpus, originated when Julia
Martinez, a member of the Santa Clara Pueblo Tribe, commenced
an action in a United States district court for declaratory and
injunctive relief in order to prevent a tribal ordinance 78 from
excluding her children from membership in the tribe. 9 The tribe
moved to dismiss the action for lack of federal jurisdiction over
what it characterized as a purely intratribal dispute.' Construing
the provisions of ICRA strictly, the Supreme Court agreed and held

77436 U.S. 49 (1978).
7

Ms. Martinez challenged the following two sections of the ordinance as

violative of ICRA's guarantee of equal protection of tribal laws:
2. That children born of marriages between male members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo and non-members shall be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
3. Children born of marriages between female members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo and non-members shall not be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.

Id. at 52.
7'The

suit underlying the Santa Claracase was structured as a class action

in which Julia Martinez represented Santa Claran women who had married men
who were not tribal members. Ms. Martinez was accompanied in the suit by her
daughter, Audrey Martinez, who represented children born to Santa Claran

women who had married non-members. Id. at 53.
The district court (D. New Mexico) concluded that it had jurisdiction and
found for the tribe on the merits of the case, holding that a federal court could
not properly "'determine which traditional values will promote cultural survival
and shall therefore be preserved . . . ."' The Tenth Circuit upheld the lower
court's finding of jurisdiction and reversed on the merits, concluding that -

absent a compelling tribal interest - the offending sections of the ordinance
must fall. Id. at 54-55.
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that jurisdiction could not be implied under ICRA's provisions, but
must be limited to explicit statutory provisions.
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall reviewed the
decisional history of tribal sovereignty and concluded that although
Congress had plenary authority to modify the immunity from suit
Indian tribes possessed as sovereigns, it had not chosen to do so.
Cognizant of the Tenth Circuit's concern that without a waiver of
sovereign immunity ICRA's guarantees would "constitute a mere
unenforceable declaration of principles," the Court nevertheless
held that the suit in question should have been precluded. Justice
Marshall stated that "[i]n the absence here of any unequivocal
expression contrary legislative intent, we conclude that suits against
the tribe under the ICRA are barred by its sovereign immunity
from suit.""1
The case however did not end at this point for the suit had
been commenced against both the tribe and its governor, Lucario
Padilla. Resolution of the sovereign immunity issue prevented only
a suit against the tribe as an entity and did not forestall a suit
against a tribal officer. To resolve this second issue the majority
turned to a discussion of the legislative history of ICRA to
determine Congress' intent in passing the act. The Court
recognized two "distinct and competing purposes" in Congress'
enactment of ICRA: to strengthen "the position of individual tribal
members vis-a-vis the tribe" and to further "tribal
self-determination." The Court held that "[w]here Congress seeks
to promote dual objectives in a single statute, courts must be more
than usually hesitant to infer from its silence a cause of action that,
while serving one legislative purpose, will disserve the other." 82
The Court concluded that Congress had struck a delicate
balance between these two competing legislative goals by limiting
the provision for appeal under ICRA to a writ of habeas corpus.
The majority determined to leave this balance intact "[u]nder these
circumstances, we are reluctant to disturb the balance between the
dual statutory objectives which Congress apparently struck in

g' Id. at 55, 59.
L2Id. at 62, 64.

Indian Civil Rights Act

29

providing only for habeas corpus relief." 83
The Santa Clara opinion's narrow interpretation of federal
review under ICRA has relegated non-habeas corpus controversies
arising under the act to tribal forums, where they run a substantial
risk of being foreclosed by the tribes' sovereign immunity from
suit."
Legal inventiveness on the part of litigants has also
produced a variety of jurisdictional theories intended to circumvent
Santa Clara, principally by bringing suit for disputes falling within
the ambit of ICRA under other federal civil rights laws. These
alternative theories of jurisdiction have met with mixed success,

3

Id.at 66. The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Marshall, was joined
by Justices Brennan, Stevens, Stewart, Powell and Burger. Justice Rehnquist
joined the opinion except for the portion determining the sovereign immunity
issue. Justice Blackmun took no part in the case. Justice White, though
agreeing with the majority's resolution of the sovereign immunity issue, wrote
a dissenting opinion arguing for the existence of a private civil remedy against
a tribal officer to redress ICRA violations. Justice White wrote:
Given Congress' concern about the deprivations of Indian rights by tribal
authorities, I cannot believe, as does the majority, that it desired the
enforcement of these rights to be left up to the very tribal authorities alleged
to have violated them. In the case of the Santa Clara Pueblo, for example,
both legislature and judicial powers are vested in the same body, the Pueblo
Council .... To suggest that this tribal body is the "appropriate" forum for the
adjudication of alleged violations of the ICRA is to ignore both reality and
Congress' desire to provide a means of redress to Indians aggrieved by their
tribal leaders.

Id. at 82.
" See, e.g., Sisseton-Wahpeton Community College v. Wynde, 18 I.L.R.
6033 (N. Plns. Intertr. Ct. App. 1990), where an intertribal court of appeals held
that:
* . .[N]ot every right the transgression of such has a corresponding remedy.
That is the very nature of tribal sovereignty from the earlier days consistent
with the Anglo-American concept of the common law. This is not to suggest
that tribal sovereignty is a child of Anglo-American sovereignty concepts, but
is to suggest that the tribal sovereignty enjoyed by a Native American tribe
should certainly be no less than the maximum enjoyment guaranteed to any
other sovereign.

...[Tlhe concept of tribal sovereignty is paramount to the concept of due
process and must of necessity be given such preeminence to guarantee the very
existence of the tribe.

Id. at 6035, 6036.
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though they are clearly subversive of Santa Clara'sholding.85
Furthermore, the cases which continued to be appealed to
federal courts under ICRA's habeas corpus provision, absent
explicit statutory language to the contrary, have generally followed
constitutional principles when determining the parameters of
ICRA's guarantees. Typical of these cases is United States v.
Lester,86 where the Eighth Circuit considered an ICRA search and
seizure case under Fourth Amendment standards. Similarly, the
Supreme Court of Arizona has held that ICRA's privilege against
self-incrimination does not provide "protection87 inferior to that of
the United States and Arizona Constitutions.,
Conclusion
Controversy continues to surround the Indian Civil Rights
Act. Legislators neglect the problem of intrusions on the civil rights
of tribal Indians by nontribal authorities, and question the effectiveness of tribal enforcement of ICRA guarantees. The legislators
investigating ICRA enforcement have not fully considered the
problem of accessibility to the federal courts which would arise if
federal forums displaced their tribal counterparts. If Congress acts
to widen the scope of federal appeals under ICRA it may well
diminish tribal sovereignty and gain only an empty victory for civil
liberties.
An alternative remedy that so far has received only scant
attention is providing funds to the tribal courts directly,8 8 and

8 See Kevin Gover & Robert Laurence, Avoiding Santa Clara v. Martinez:
The Litigation in Federal Court of Civil Actions Under the Indian Civil Rights
Act, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 497 (1985).

86 647 F.2d 869 (8th Cir. 1981).
87 Tracy v. Superior Court, 810 P.2d. 1030, 1047 (Ariz. 1991) (upholding
order of superior court compelling attendance of non-Indian witness before
District Court of Navajo Nation).
Enforcement of the Indian Civil Rights Act, Hearings Before the U.S.

Commission on Civil Rights, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20 (September 29,
1988)(statement of Tom Tso, Chief Justice, Navajo Nation) The following
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encouraging the development of an enhanced network of tribal and
intertribal appellate courts that can free jurists from the political
intricacies of any particular tribe. If Congress is true to the past
and to its promises, no clearer path lies to furthering its dual
interests in tribal sovereignty and civil liberties than in allowing the

tribal courts to develop an autonomous body of civil liberties law
that can synthesize tribal principles with the principles embodied
in the Constitution. This effort would by no means be as fast and
easy as a statute expanding federal jurisdiction over ICRA claims,
but in the long run may offer a more effective remedy for tribal
intrusions on civil liberties; a remedy that may well result in
speedier trials with less expense to the litigants. Clearly tribal and
intertribal appellate courts are uniquely qualified to balance the
competing claims of tribal self-government and individual civil
liberties that are embodied in the Indian Civil Rights Act. These
institutions hold great promise for protecting both tribal

governments and their members from an erosion of fundamental
guaranties deeply rooted in history.

insights provided by the justice are particularly worth repeating:
I think we must all understand that there are over 200, I believe,
Indian courts across the Nation, across the United States, and each of those
tribal courts are at a different level of development and different levels of
sophistication. What the courts up north, or another court in another part of
the United States, what their needs are may be different than what the needs
are on the Navajo Reservation. So I think that each particular court must be
dealt with separately in their own setting and according to their own needs.
I have a lot of recommendations on ways that the Navajo courts can
be assisted and improved. And certainly, more funding is one thing.
Establishment of more facilities, office facilities, court buildings, that is
essentially what we need. But, because of lack of funding, we are not
developing in that area. Certainly, training for judges is needed. And we have
been working with what we have. And I think we have been making good
improvement towards the development of judges. Yes, funding, more
facilities, equipment, up-to-date equipment, computers for our record system
so at some point when the Commission asks us for information, we can just
punch one button and out comes that information.
We have assistance of that nature, but that all requires more funding
with less red tape in getting the funding from the Bureau. And I understand
when Congress appropriates money, it goes through several different hands
before it comes out to the field. So if all the middlemen are cut out of the
funding, that way you can get more dollars to the field operation, rather than
the administration.

Id. at 21.

